Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on Public Policy by Grechyna, Daryna
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Quantifying the Impact of Political
Frictions on Public Policy
Daryna Grechyna
Middlesex University London
June 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68918/
MPRA Paper No. 68918, posted 20 January 2016 05:27 UTC
Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on
Public Policy
Daryna Grechynay
January 19, 2016
Abstract
We study the role of political frictions in scal policy outcomes. We propose a
simple model of scal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government,
political turnover, and another political friction which can be interpreted either as
political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover
increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking lead
to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of di¤erent political frictions
for scal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We nd
that the presence of political turnover is crucial for accounting for the variation
in public debt levels and that public corruption measures outperform the political
polarization measures in explaining the variation in scal variables.
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1 Introduction
The political nature of public decision-making imply that scal policy is not necessarily
set by benevolent government, and thus might not be e¢ cient. Even in Western Europe
and North America, considered to be the most developed regions in the world, many coun-
tries su¤er from imperfections in political institutions. A number of theoretical studies
have shown that political frictions are the main cause of public debt, high distortionary
taxes, and government overspending, lead to lower levels of output and investment and
impair the long run welfare in the economy (see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990;
Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Yared, 2010; Azzimonti, 2011). The main political frictions
analyzed by the theoretical studies are the lack of commitment by the government to
the long-term scal plan and political uncertainty or political turnover. The evidence
suggests that both of these frictions are present to some extent in the modern economies.
Indeed, the government budget plan is updated on annual basis and the composition of
the government changes over time. The lack of government commitment induces the party
in power to re-optimize on its scal policy every time period and leads to distortionary
taxation of inelastic assets (i.e., interest rate on public debt or tax on physical capital).
Uncertainty about the prospects of reelection reduces the e¤ective discount factor of the
government, making the party in power short-sighted relative to the households and lead-
ing to overborrowing and overspending by the public sector. The main potential causes
of political turnover rent-seeking activities by the politicians and political polarization
in the society further reinforce production distortions.
The aim of this work is to summarize these political frictions in a simple model and
to use the model to quantify the impact of political frictions on scal policy by looking
at the data. We ask how much of the variation in public debt, government spending,
and taxes can be explained by the measures of political stability, public rent-seeking,
and political polarization in a sample of developed countries. This question is important
both from economic and from the policy perspective. If the political frictions account for
a signicant fraction of variation in scal variables, it may be more e¢ cient to reform
the political system in the worst performing countries rather than to impose restrictions
on spending or borrowing on their scal authorities, as has been done recently in the
European Union. We consider developed countries which allows us to concentrate on the
role of political frictions alone and at the steady state, abstracting from various other
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institutional and economic frictions that characterize economies in transition.
Following the related studies, our analysis is based on the Lucas and Stokeys (1983)
type economic model with a lack of commitment by the government. We consider di¤er-
entiable Markov perfect equilibrium government policy, assuming that the reputational
mechanisms are not operative. We discuss two political frictions: political uncertainty (to
which we also refer to as political turnover) and non-alignment of government and citizen
preferences. The former friction implies that the governments are short-sighted; the latter
friction implies that the government does not maximize the utility of the representative
households. We discuss two interpretations of this second political friction. First, there
may be disagreement in the society about the composition of public good, with the party
in power providing only the public good which is preferred by its electorate. In such case
the political friction we refer to is political polarization (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Azz-
imonti, 2011). Second, the government can have preferences for rent-seeking and divert a
part of public spending. In such case the political friction is public rent-seeking (Yared,
2010). In the considered framework, one parameter captures political uncertainty and
another parameter can be interpreted as capturing either political polarization or public
rent-seeking.
We nd that political turnover or political polarization/public rent-seeking alone can-
not explain the pattern of public debt and government spending in developed countries.
Without political turnover, public debt is zero at the steady state, regardless of the
magnitude of the other political friction. Without political polarization/rent-seeking, an
increase in public debt due to a reduction in e¤ective discount factor of the government
caused by political uncertainty leads to an increase in private consumption and a decrease
in public consumption. In the data, correlation of public debt and government spending
is positive. Combining political turnover with political polarization or public rent-seeking
allows to replicate public debt - public spending relationship by varying two parameters
governing political frictions.
Further, we calibrate the model to the data from twenty developed countries and
evaluate the contribution of the variation in political frictions to the variation in scal
variables in these countries. For every country in the sample, we consider the economic
indicators and the measures of political frictions averaged over the period 1995-2007.
This time period is dictated by the data availability (the common measures of public
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rent-seeking are available starting from 1995) and by the absence of signicant economic
uctuations (the Great Recession followed after 2007 had a signicant impact on all
economic variables which has not been mitigated by the complete recovery up to day).
The data on political frictions is based on surveys and rely on perceptions. In order to
avoid possible shortcomings of using any particular indicator, we use several measures of
political frictions in the data as follows: the World Bank measure of political stability, the
World Bank measure of public rent-seeking (the variables "Political Stability and Absence
of Violence" and "Control of Corruption" from the Worldwide Governance Indicators,
respectively), the Corruption Perception Index (from Transparency International), the
Political Polarization measure from the Quality of Government Dataset (by Teorell et
al. 2015), and the Political Polarization measures by Lindqvist and Ostling (2010). We
conclude that the World Bank measures of political stability and public rent-seeking
produce the best model results (the correlation coe¢ cients between the model-generated
variables and the data of around 40% for public debt and around 20% for public spending,
and taxes). The political polarization measures produce negative correlation coe¢ cients
between the model-generated variables and the data and are outperformed by the public
rent-seeking measures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey reviews some of the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the scal policy model featuring the lack of commitment by the
government, political uncertainty, and another political friction, which can be interpreted
either as political polarization or as political rent-seeking. Section 4 discusses the prop-
erties of the model. Section 5 evaluates the impact of political frictions on scal variables
in a sample of twenty developed countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper aims at evaluating the consequences of political frictions for scal policy in de-
veloped economies. To that end, we formulate a dynamic political economy model which
collects several key features from the models with political frictions studied in the liter-
ature. These features are: political turnover or political uncertainty, public rent-seeking
or political polarization, and the lack of government commitment (thus, we consider the
scal policy in a time-consistent setup).
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Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) were among the rst to
show theoretically that political turnover in the presence of political polarization leads to
higher public debt levels in a time-consistent setup. In their work, as well as in the works
of their followers, political polarization is dened as disagreement in the society about
the desired composition of public goods. Thus, political turnover is a consequence of
di¤erence in preferences of the society and not of politician misconduct. Azzimonti (2011)
endogenized political turnover in a neoclassical growth model with political polarization
via a voting model in which the outcome of the election is dictated by political preference
shock as well as voters expectations about the economic outcomes. She showed that
both political turnover and political polarization impair investment rates and economic
growth rates, at the same time leading to excess government spending. In this paper, we
evaluate the role of political turnover and political polarization in public policy dened
as government decisions about public debt, public spending, and income taxes.
If there is no disagreement in the society about the public policy, political turnover
can be an instrument to discipline the politician for misbehavior such as rent-seeking
activities or pork-barrel spending. Battaglini and Coate (2008) built a political economy
model with legislature who can distribute revenues back to their districts through pork-
barrel spending. Their theory predicts that public debt and taxes are higher than those
in the economy without political frictions. Caballero and Yared (2010) characterize the
equilibrium transition path of an economy managed by a sequence of politicians who
face political risk and who care about both household welfare and private rents. They
nd that the rent-seeking government overborrows and under-taxes along the equilibrium
path relative to a benevolent government if political risk is high relative to economic
uncertainty and over-saves and over-taxes if economic volatility is su¢ ciently high relative
to political uncertainty. Yared (2010) studies optimal taxes and debt management in
a stochastic economy in the presence of rent-seeking politicians which can be removed
from o¢ ce for misbehavior. He nds that taxes are volatile and persistent with rent-
seeking government, di¤erently from the benevolent government case, and rise in debt is
e¢ cient in the sense that it precludes excessive rent-seeking. Acemoglu et al. (2008a,
2008b, 2011a, 2011b), similarly to Yared (2010), show that the need to provide incentives
to politician in power creates political economy distortions. They demonstrate that if
politicians are characterized by lower patience level than the citizens, the best subgame
5
perfect equilibrium is characterized by positive long-run capital taxation. In the setup we
consider in this paper, we are able to evaluate the role of public rent-seeking combined
with political uncertainty in determination of public debt, spending, and taxes. We nd
that public rent-seeking data performs better that political polarization data in accounting
for variation in public variables.
Political distortions depend on another important characteristic of public policy, which
accords with the presence of political turnover: the lack of commitment by the govern-
ment to its scal plan. As a consequence of the absence of commitment, the government
reoptimizes on its policy every period. The scal outcomes under no commitment can be
di¤erent from those that would occur under the full commitment by the government even
in the absence of any political frictions (see, for example, Klein et al., 2008; Debortoli
and Nunes, 2013). On the other hand, as shown by Debortoli and Nunes (2010), political
frictions can lead to ine¢ ciencies even if the government is completely benevolent and
commits to its scal plan while in power. We consider a time-consistent setup in which
the government reoptimizes on its scal plan every period. It has been shown that the
interactions between the government and the households in the case of absence of govern-
ment commitment can give rise to multiple equilibria supported by trigger strategies and
reputation mechanisms. The literature takes di¤erent stands on which solution method
to apply and which set of equilibria to characterize. A number of studies characterize the
entire set of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations subject to incentive constraints faced by politi-
cians. Another approach is to restrict a set of equilibria to those that are dened only
by payo¤-relevant states, that is, to consider Markov-perfect equilibria. We follow the
second approach and consider di¤erentiable Markov equilibrium.
A number of studies have discussed the consequences of political frictions for economic
uctuations. For example, Ales et al. (2014) demonstrate how economic and political
cycles can be jointly determined and production distortions result if policymakers are non-
benevolent, cannot commit to policies, and have private information about the government
budget and rents. Azzimonti (2015) obtains economic uctuations due to asymmetries
in reelection probabilities across parties that compete for the o¢ ce. Aguiar et al. (2009)
and Aguiar and Amador (2011) show how political frictions lead to economic distortions
in small open economy. In this paper, we consider the long-run consequences of political
frictions. Therefore, we analyze economic outcomes in developed countries and use the
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predictions of the model at the steady state.
3 Description of Economic Environment
Consider an innite-horizon economy populated by agents of measure 1, a half of which
live in region N, and a half on which live in region S of the country. Agents work in the
production sector for a competitive wage and enjoy the consumption of private goods,
ct, public goods, gJt , and leisure, xt. Agent preferences over public good may be region-
specic (in such case, J 2{N,S}; more on this below). Every period, the agents have time
endowment of 1, purchase one-period public bonds from the government, bt+1, at price qt,
pay taxes on their income,  t; and receive income from previous period public bonds, bt.
Their budget constraint in period t is given by:
ct + qtbt+1 = (1   t)wt(1  xt) + bt: (1)
The agents maximize their life-time utility,
P1
t=0 
tU(ct; xt; g
J
t ), where U; the instan-
taneous utility function, is increasing and concave in each of its arguments, subject to
their budget constraints and given government policy, and  is the discount factor. The
resource constraint in this economy is given by:
Ct +Gt = A(1 Xt) = yt; (2)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Gt is total public spending, 1 Xt denotes total labor,
yt is the total output, and A is the technology parameter.
3.1 Government Policy
There are two political parties that compete for the o¢ ce. The incumbent party cannot
follow a long-term scal plan due to the lack of commitment technology. Moreover, with
probability p the incumbent party will stay in the power in the following period, and with
probability 1   p it will be replaced by its political opponent. Under such conditions,
the party in power plays a game against the opposition taking their policy as given. To
characterize government policy, we adopt the notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium, where
policy functions depend only on fundamentals.
Every period, the party in power decides on the issues of public bonds and the levels of
taxes to nance public spending and to repay previous period public debt (previous debt
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obligations are always honored because default is very costly) to maximize its objective.
The incumbent makes decisions about its policy taking into account anticipated next
period policies of itself, if re-elected, or its opponent, if not re-elected. We assume that
p is exogenous. Azzimonti (2011) provides microfoundations for the determinants of p;
in her work, under particular assumptions, endogenously determined p is independent of
economic state variables in equilibrium.
Consider the following instantaneous utility function of the incumbent party:
u(ct; xt) + v(g
J
t ); (3)
where u and v are increasing and concave in their arguments,  2 [0; 1] and v(0) = v.
We refer to two interpretations of this utility function.
First, following Azzimonti (2011, 2015), we can assume that gJt is indexed by region,
J2{N,S}, and (3) coincides with the instantaneous utility function of the agents from
region J; U(ct; xt; gJt ) = u(ct; xt) + v(g
J
t ). In this case, there is disagreement in the
population over the desired composition of public expenditures and the party in power
provides only its region-specic public good. The parameter  denes the importance
of public good in overall utility of the agent and measures the degree of polarization in
the country (the higher ; the more important the utility derived from the public good
relative to the utility from the private consumption and leisure and, because agents enjoy
utility only from their region-specic public good, the higher political polarization in
the country). Under such interpretation, political turnover is a natural consequence of
preference heterogeneity in the society.
Second, we can assume that the rst term in (3) coincides with the instantaneous
utility of the households while the second term represents utility derived from the private
rent of politicians in power, so that U(ct; xt; gJt ) = u(ct; xt). The parameter  measures
the degree of public rent-seeking (the higher ; the more weight is put by the politicians in
power on rent-seeking activities relative to the maximization of welfare of the electorate).
In this case, the public policy of both parties is the same and the political turnover
is dened by political preferences unrelated to economic outcomes (for example, moral,
ethnic, or religious).
Under both interpretations, the party out of power enjoys instantaneous utility u(ct; xt)+
v. Given that the agent utility function (3) is either separable in public consumption
(under rst interpretation), or independent of public consumption (under second inter-
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pretation), and given that both regions are taxed at the same rate, agent decisions about
private consumption, labor supply, and purchases of public bonds are independent of their
region of residence. Therefore, Ct = 1=2ct + 1=2ct = ct, Xt = xt, Gt = gJt . The agents
consumption, work, and saving decisions are determined by (1) and the following two
optimality conditions:
ux(ct; xt)=uc(ct; xt) = (1   t)wt; (4)
qtuc(ct; xt) = uc(ct+1; xt+1): (5)
We use primal approach and express the problem of the government in terms of choos-
ing household allocations and savings that implement optimal scal policy. In particular,
we combine (1), (4), and (5) into one implementability constraint by substituting away
taxes and prices. We can express public spending from the resource constraint as follows:
G(ct; xt) = A(1  xt)  ct; (6)
The government maximizes its value function subject to the optimality conditions of
the households (4), (5), and the resource constraint (6), given anticipated future policies.
It announces its policy, t = fct; xt; bt+1g, at the beginning of each period, after being
elected or reelected and after observing the level of inherited debt, bt. Given the sequence
of events and the separability between the economic and political dimensions, the only
payo¤-relevant state variable for the government is the level of inherited debt. Denote
anticipated future policy as (bt+1) = fC(bt+1);X(bt+1);B(bt+1)g.
The problem of the party in power takes the form:
max
c;x;b0
u(c; x) + v(G(c; x)) + pV (b0) + (1  p)W (b0); (7)
s:t: :
ucc+ u
0
cb
0   ux(1  x)  ucb = 0; (8)
where prime denotes next period, V (b0) is the value function of the party in power, and
W (b0) is the value function of the party out of power.
Government policy in equilibrium is dened as follows.
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of policy functions fC(b);X(b);B(b)g and value
functions V (b) and W (b); such that the policy functions solve:
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fC(b); X(b); B(b)g = argmaxc;x;b0 u(c; x) + v(G(c; x)) + pV (b0) + (1   p)W (b0)
subject to (6) and (8); and the value functions are given by (9) and (10) as follows:
V (b) = u(C(b);X(b)) + v(G(C(b);X(b))) + pV (B(b)) + (1  p)W (B(b)); (9)
W (b) = u(C(b);X(b)) + v + (1  p)V (B(b)) + pW (B(b)): (10)
We assume the policy functions followed by future governments are di¤erentiable and
concentrate on the symmetric policies by the parties in power.
Denote the implementability constraint (8) as (c; x; b; b0) and let  be the Lagrange
multiplier associated with this constraint. The optimality conditions associated with the
government problem consist of (6), (8), and the following equations:
uc   vg + c = 0; (11)
ux   Avg + x = 0; (12)
pV 0b + (1  p)W 0b + b0 = 0; (13)
where the last equation contains the derivatives of the value functions given by the fol-
lowing expressions (see derivations in the appendix):
V 0b =  0u0c; (14)
W 0b = u
0
cC
0
b + u
0
xX
0
b + 

(1  p)( 00u00c ) + p
 0000b0 + p00u00c
(1  p)

B0b: (15)
Equations (11) and (12) dene the private-public consumption and consumption-
leisure wedges caused by distortionary taxes. Equation (13) species the optimal choice
of public debt to balance the current and next-period wedges taking into account the
e¤ects of future policy on public debt accumulation. The term (1   p)W 0b captures the
additional cost of political polarization/public rent-seeking. It reects the e¤ect of current
government policy on future public spending if the current incumbent is not reelected.
4 Discussion
The consensus in theoretical literature (outlined in Section 2) is that political uncertainty
reduces the discount factor of the government compared to the households, leading to
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positive debt and higher taxes in equilibrium while political polarization or political rent-
seeking lead to overspending by the government.
In this section we analyze whether these properties hold in the version of the economy
described in the previous section. The system of equations (6), (8), (11)-(15), which
describes the optimal solution to the government problem, is highly non-linear and does
not have analytical solution in general. First, we consider a particular example of utility
function that allows closed-form solution to form an idea about the relationship among
the variables in the model. Then, we discuss the properties of the model in a more general
case with the help of numerical analysis.
4.1 An Example of Economy with Analytical Solution
Consider the utility function of the party in power which is linear in leisure and public
spending with weights 1 and  > 1, respectively; assume that the utility is logarithmic in
consumption (3) with weight a, 0 < a < (   1)=; and normalize A to 1.1
We obtain the following characterization of this economy at the steady state (proof is
in the appendix):
Lemma 1: At the steady state of the economy characterized by u(ct; xt) = a ln ct + xt
and v(gt) = gt; with  > 1, 0 < a < (   1)=, private consumption and leisure are
increasing in public debt, public consumption is decreasing in public debt, public debt is
zero if there is no political turnover ( p = 1) and positive if there is political turnover
( p < 1); higher weight on public consumption, , leads to higher public spending, lower
public debt and private consumption, and higher taxes.
Numerical analysis suggests that the properties of the variables in the particular exam-
ple considered in this subsection also hold for more general utility functions, as discussed
below.
4.2 A More General Case
We refer to numerical analysis to characterize the impact of political frictions on scal
policy and on economic outcomes for more general utility functions. Description of the
1This example has been considered by Debortoli and Nunes (2013) in the economy without political
turnover.
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numerical algorithm is provided in the appendix. We consider the following utility of the
party in power:
U =
(cax1 a)1 
1   + 
g1 
1   : (16)
Figure 1 shows the steady state public debt, government spending, taxes, and private
consumption as functions of political turnover (p) and political polarization or public
rent-seeking (). We use the following parameters to construct the plots:  = 0:98;
a = 0:3;  = 1;  = 1; A = 1 (changing any of the parameter values within the reasonable
range does not change the qualitative behavior of variables depicted on Figure 1).
Figure 1: The variables as functions of p and .
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Γ
p
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p
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Γ
p
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The impact of political instability, p: Similar to the conclusions of the related
studies, we obtain that public debt increases with political instability. In uncertain
prospects of reelection, the party in power is short-sighted relative to its electorate and
therefore is a net borrower in equilibrium. If there is no political uncertainty, public debt
is zero at the (stable) steady state. Private consumption is an increasing function of
public debt, so it also increases with political turnover. This is because the households
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can enjoy higher consumption from interest income on their savings in the form of public
bonds. Similar to private consumption, leisure is an increasing function of public debt,
thus, it increases with political turnover. Thus, the total output is lower when political
instability is higher. On the other hand, public consumption is a decreasing function of
public debt as the total resources available for public spending are lower under higher
political instability. The tax rate set by the government is proportional to the marginal
utility of private consumption (from the optimality conditions of the household problem).
Therefore, the income tax (and, in this economy, the tax revenues as a share of GDP)
decreases with political instability. Under higher political uncertainty, the government
prefers to nance spending by issuing debt rather than by increasing taxes.
The impact of political polarization and/or political rent-seeking, : Sim-
ilar to the conclusions of the related studies, we obtain that public spending increases
with political polarization (or rent-seeking). This is a straight-forward consequence of
polarization/rent-seeking being modelled as a value of marginal utility from government
spending. Higher public spending is nanced through income taxes which also increase
with polarization.
At the same time, given the level of political uncertainty, higher polarization or pref-
erence for rent-seeking activities reduce equilibrium public debt level. This is a feature
of the model economy: government consumption crowds out savings by the households
in equilibrium, leading to lower levels of public debt and private consumption. The labor
supply increases (it is a decreasing function of public debt) and therefore the total output
also increases with the degree of polarization (rent-seeking).
At a rst glance, the predictions of the model regarding the role of political polarization
(or political rent-seeking) seem controversial. Except for reducing private consumption,
this political friction leads to higher output and lower public debt, and both are usually
considered as an improvement of economic conditions. However, political polarization or
political rent-seeking are usually among the main causes of political turnover. If there is no
disagreement in the society about the composition of public goods and if the government
in power is completely benevolent, there would be no reason to throw the politicians out
of power. It is therefore the interplay between political polarization and political turnover
what denes the nal impact of these political frictions on scal variables and economic
outcomes.
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In the next section, we compare the data on political frictions and economic indicators
in a sample of twenty developed countries, and use the model to characterize the joint
inuence of political (in)stability and political polarization/rent-seeking on scal variables
in the considered sample.
5 Reconciling Theory and Data
The aim of this section is to evaluate the contribution of political frictions to variation
in scal variables in developed economies. First, we discuss the properties of the data on
political and economic variables in a sample of twenty developed countries (the sample
size is dictated by the availability of all necessary data). Second, we project the data
on political frictions into the model to calculate the scal and economic variables in the
model and compare the results with characteristics of the data.
We use the following economic indicators (the data is from the World Bank): general
government debt (bg=y), central government debt (bc=y), government consumption (g=y),
and private consumption (c=y) shares of GDP; real GDP (y); and taxes on income and
prots (). We consider both general government debt and central government debt to
check the robustness of the results. All data is averaged over the time period 1995-2007.
This time period is dictated by the data availability (the common measures of public
rent-seeking are available starting from 1995) and by the absence of signicant economic
uctuations during that period. The levels of real GDP in every country in the sample
are normalized by the average level of real GDP across all the countries in the sample.
To reduce the consequences of data limitations, we consider several indicators of politi-
cal frictions. We use the inverse of the Worldwide Governance Indicators variable "Control
of Corruption" and the inverse of the Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index as measures of public rent-seeking (we denote these variables as c1 and c2, respec-
tively). We use "dpi_polariz" variable from the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell
et al. 2015), and the average of variables "SD_EQUALITY" and "SD_PRIVATE" from
Lindqvist and Ostling (2010) to measure political polarization (we denote these variables
as p1 and p2, respectively). Finally, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators vari-
able "Political Stability and Absence of Violence" as a measure of political stability (we
denote it as p). All the variables are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: The Data.
Country p c1 c2 p1 p2 y bg=y bc=y g=y  c=y
Australia 1.023 0.517 0.115 1.385 2.425 0.804 0.403 0.239 0.175 0.236 0.578
Austria 1.106 0.491 0.127 2.000 2.335 0.928 0.699 0.647 0.191 0.282 0.543
Belgium 0.927 0.740 0.151 2.000 2.827 0.890 1.119 1.041 0.215 0.258 0.520
Canada 0.992 0.487 0.113 0.462 2.439 0.856 1.087 0.622 0.198 0.149 0.554
Denmark 1.221 0.409 0.104 2.000 2.193 1.188 0.507 0.406 0.243 0.318 0.485
Finland 1.539 0.406 0.104 1.538 2.335 0.901 0.443 0.571 0.210 0.221 0.496
France 0.567 0.738 0.145 1.231 2.599 0.853 0.715 0.639 0.226 0.174 0.549
Germany 0.973 0.523 0.127 2.000 2.494 0.870 0.626 0.412 0.187 0.107 0.569
Ireland 1.303 0.641 0.130 1.154 2.513 1.104 0.319 0.374 0.160 0.256 0.464
Italy 0.652 2.133 0.212 0.385 2.472 0.795 1.084 1.182 0.184 0.227 0.593
Japan 1.063 0.881 0.146 0.308 2.026 0.892 1.403 1.403 0.171 0.101 0.568
Luxembourg 1.411 0.518 0.118 1.000 2.537 1.861 0.066 0.043 0.154 0.251 0.388
Netherlands 1.174 0.465 0.113 2.000 1.943 1.011 0.610 0.561 0.218 0.211 0.487
Norway 1.299 0.467 0.113 2.000 2.085 1.603 0.436 0.351 0.204 0.317 0.450
Portugal 1.130 0.853 0.155 1.538 2.542 0.463 0.627 0.666 0.192 0.214 0.639
Spain 0.073 0.806 0.157 1.385 2.676 0.628 0.574 0.526 0.171 0.157 0.587
Sweden 1.319 0.445 0.108 2.000 2.073 1.004 0.640 0.535 0.251 0.258 0.463
Switzerland 1.314 0.469 0.114 0.000 2.727 1.353 0.537 0.259 0.111 0.091 0.577
The UK 0.563 0.496 0.117 0.000 2.367 0.941 0.436 0.473 0.186 0.259 0.635
The USA 0.392 0.616 0.132 0.923 2.403 1.053 0.738 0.449 0.147 0.112 0.663
Data Sources: the World Bank, Teorell et al. (2015).
Comparison of the data across countries suggest that countries characterized by higher
output per capita and lower consumption per capita are also characterized by higher
political stability, lower public rent-seeking and lower public debt levels (though, there is
no clear relationship between output and political polarization measures). For example,
Luxembourg has the highest level of GDP in the sample and one of the highest levels of
political stability combined with one of the lowest levels of public rent-seeking and the
lowest level of public debt in the sample. Italy has one of the lowest levels of political
stability combined with one of the highest levels of political polarization and the highest
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level of public rent-seeking in the sample. At the same time, Italy is characterized by one
of the highest levels of public debt, relatively high public consumption and relatively low
output as compared with other countries in the sample.
In Table 2 we summarize the signs of the correlation coe¢ cients among the scal,
economic, and political variables in the model, keeping one of the two political frictions
xed, and in the data. For the measures of political friction  (c1; c2; p1; and p2) Table
2 reports the average correlation coe¢ cient across di¤erent measures of  (the correlation
coe¢ cients are similar across di¤erent measures of  and always of the same sign).
Table 2: The sign of the correlation coe¢ cients among political and economic variables
in the model and in the data.
p  y b=y g=y  c=y
p 1 N/A + - + + -
 -0.33 1 + - + + +
y 0.47 -0.25 1 - + + -
b=y -0.29 0.14 -0.48 1 - - +
g=y 0.13 -0.27 -0.22 0.13 1 + -
 0.34 -0.20 0.26 -0.39 0.52 1 -
c=y -0.67 0.32 -0.67 0.39 -0.32 -0.53 1
Notation: the upper diagonal contains the signs of the correlation coe¢ cients in the model; the lower
diagonal contains the correlation coe¢ cients in the data. For the political polarization/rent-seeking
measure  the correlation coe¢ cients are the averages across the considered measures of political
polarization/rent-seeking.
The results reported in Table 2 suggest that both in the model and in the data,
government spending and taxes increase with political stability, are positively correlated
among themselves and negatively correlated with private consumption; government debt
and private consumption as shares of GDP decrease with political stability, are positively
correlated among themselves and negatively correlated with taxes; output is positively
correlated with taxes and negatively correlated with public debt and consumption shares.
The signs are opposite in the model and in the data for the correlations of  (averages
across the considered measures in the data) with the GDP, taxes, and public debt and
public spending as shares of GDP, and for the correlations of government spending with
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GDP and public debt share of GDP. In order to evaluate the model performance in
capturing the relationship among scal variables, we should account for the existence of
relationship between p and , which are correlated in the data.
Therefore, we calibrate the model discussed in the previous sections to the sample
of considered economies. The sample based on developed countries and the data based
on the averages over a relatively long period of time justify the approximation of these
economies using the steady state of the model.
We x the discount factor to match the average return on government bonds in the
considered economies,  = 0:98, and we choose the utility parameters to match the
average public spending share of GDP across all countries in the sample: a = 0:3: We
assume separable utility, logarithmic in all arguments:  = 1;  = 1.2
The political stability variable in the model, p, is interpreted as probability that the
incumbent will stay in power in the given period of time; this variable must lie in the
interval [0,1]. The World Bank measure of political stability varies in the range [-2.5; 2.5].
Therefore, we need to re-scale the data on p in order to be able to use this variable in the
model. We proceed as follows. We choose two countries, characterized by the highest and
the lowest level of political stability (Finland and Spain, see Table 1) and compute the
values of A, p and  necessary to replicate the GDP, public debt and public consumption
in these countries. Let us denote the resulting measures of political frictions for Finland
and Spain as pmFinland; p
m
Spain; and 
m
Finland, 
m
Spain. Then, we can state the following
relationship between these model-generated variables and corresponding measures from
the data, pdF inland; p
d
Spain; and 
d
F inland, 
d
Spain:
pmFinland = 1 + 2p
d
F inland; (17)
pmSpain = 1 + 2p
d
Spain: (18)
mFinland = 1 + 2
d
F inland; (19)
mSpain = 1 + 2
d
Spain: (20)
2We should note that the results of calibration discussed in this section are robust to changes in the
parameters ; a, , ; and hold for di¤erent forms of the utility function u(c; x) (e.g., the utility function
separable in consumption and leisure and GHH utility function).
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The coe¢ cients 1; 2; 1 and 2 determined by the systems of equations (17)-(18)
and (19)-(20) can be used to re-scale the political friction measures from the data into
the political frictions in the model.
Finally, we calculate the values of the scal variables (public debt, government spend-
ing, and taxes) predicted by the model given the re-scaled measures of political frictions
from the data and choosing the parameter A for each country so, that the output gener-
ated by the model is the same as output of this country in the data.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 3 which reports the correlation coe¢ -
cients between the variables generated by the model and the data, for di¤erent measures
of .
Table 3: Calibration results. Correlations between the variables generated by the model
with political frictions and the data.
Corr n  measure c1 c2 p1 p2
(bmg =y
m; bdg=y
d
) 0.368 0.357 -0.133 0.423
(bmc =y
m; bdc=y
d
) 0.494 0.460 -0.110 0.373
(gm=ym; gd=y
d
) 0.182 0.184 -0.027 -0.247
(m;  d) 0.172 0.262 -0.223 -0.016
(ym; yd) 1 1 1 1
Notation: bg=y -general government debt as a share of GDP; bc=y - central government debt as a share
of GDP; g=y - public consumption as a share of GDP;  - taxes; y - output. (V m; V d) - denotes the
correlation between variable V in the model and in the data.
Table 3 suggests that the World Bank measure of rent-seeking (c1) Transparency
International measure of public rent-seeking (c2) produce very similar results (columns
named "c1" and "c2"): the correlation coe¢ cients between the model-generated vari-
ables and the data of around 40% for public debt and around 20% for public spending,
and taxes. On the other hand, the political polarization measure from the Quality of Gov-
ernment Dataset (p1) produces negative correlation coe¢ cients between all the model-
generated variables and the data. The political polarization measure from Lindqvist and
Ostling, 2010 (p2) produces the correlation coe¢ cient of around 40% between the public
debt levels generated by the model and from the data, but negative correlation coe¢ -
cients for the model-generated and empirical public spending and taxes. Thus, the public
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rent-seeking measures outperform the political polarization measures in explaining the
variation in scal variables in the considered economies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluated the role of political frictions for public policy outcomes, using
a parsimonious model of scal policy. We conclude that political turnover (or political
uncertainty/instability) increases public debt levels while political polarization or public
rent-seeking lead to higher public spending. When the measures of political frictions from
a sample of twenty developed countries are incorporated into the model, public corruption
measures outperform the political polarization measures in explaining the variation in
scal variables.
The analysis in this paper suggests several directions for further research. One impor-
tant variable through which public policy a¤ects economic variables and which is missing
from the model is capital formation. Political frictions can distort investment (Azzimonti,
2011), which in turn has consequences for private consumption and leisure. However, in
many attempts to solve the economy model with both physical capital and public debt
we did not succeed in nding stationary solutions to the model; related discussion on the
problems of such models can be found in Ortigueira et al. (2012). Moreover, there may be
other factors inuencing scal variables in developed countries, such as, for example, the
interest rate (which in the model is xed at 1= for all the countries), nancial markets,
openness to trade, or prolonged economic shocks. Extending the model to include other
frictions, such as imperfect nancial markets and default risk, or exogenous economic
shocks, could help to clarify the importance of political frictions in comparison to other
major factors a¤ecting public policy and economic performance in developed countries.
Finally, additional investigation on the determinants of political polarization, public rent-
seeking, and their connection with political uncertainty could give more insights on the
main political drivers of scal distortions.
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Appendix
Derivation of the Government Optimality Conditions
The rst order conditions associated with the government problem are the following:
uc   vg + c = 0; (21)
ux   Avg + x = 0; (22)
pV 0b + (1  p)W 0b + b0 = 0; (23)
where
c = uccc+ uc   uxc(1  x)  uccb;
x = ucxc  uxx(1  x) + uxx   ucxb;
b0 = (u
0
ccb
0Cb + u0cxb
0Xb + u0c):
In order to nd Vb; totally di¤erentiate the value function V (b) given by (9) with respect
to b :
Vb = ucCb + uxXb   vgCb(b)  AvgXb + (pV 0b + (1  p)W 0b)Bb:
Substituting (21) - (23) in the last expression and simplifying using the fact that
cCb + xXb + b + b0Bb = 0; obtain the following expression for Vb:
Vb =  uc: (24)
In order to nd Wb; totally di¤erentiate the value function W (b), given by (10), with
respect to b :
Wb = ucCb + uxXb + ((1  p)V 0b + pW 0b)Bb:
Using (23) and (24) to express W 0b and V
0
b and substitute them into (24), obtain the
following expression for Wb:
Wb = ucCb + uxXb + 

(1  p)( 0u0c) + p
 00b0 + p0u0c
(1  p)

Bb: (25)
The expressions (14) and (15) in the text are equations (24) and (25) updated one
period.
Proof of Lemma 1
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The optimality conditions (8), (11)-(12) with the instantaneous utility considered in
the example simplify as follows:
a+ a=c0b0   1 + x  ab=c = 0; (26)
a=c   + ab=c2 = 0; (27)
1   +  = 0; (28)
Equation (27) is quadratic in consumption and can be solved for consumption as a function
of public debt. The following root features positive consumption: C(b) = a(1+(1+4( 
1)b=a)0:5)=(2); from where Cb > 0. From (26), Xb = a=c20C0bb
0B0b   a=c0bB0b + a=c 
ab=c2Cb; which, evaluated at the stable steady state is equal to (1 B0b)a=c(1 b=cCb) >
0, because 0 < b=cCb < 1:
Then, from the resource constraint (1), Gb < 0. Increasing the weight on public
spending increases g; thus b; x, and c decrease. From the optimality condition of the
household problem, taxes are negatively related to private consumption, so they increase
when private consumption decrease.
Finally, from (12) evaluated at the steady state and given that Xb and Cb are positive
for any b, b = 0 if p = 1 and b > 0 if 0 < p < 1.k
Numerical algorithm
To solve the system of equations (6), (8), (11)-(15), the unknown policy functions are
approximated by the Hermite polynomials of the third order. That is,
C(b) =
Pn
i=0 ac;iHi(b);
X(b) =
Pn
i=0 ax;iHi(b);
B(b) =
Pn
i=0 ab;iHi(b);
(29)
where n = 3 and Hi(b) denotes the Hermite polynomial of order i, and aY;i denotes the
coe¢ cient of the policy function Y associated with the Hermite polynomial of order i.
Given the functional forms in (29), the solution to the original system with  substituted
away, consists of nding 3n unknown coe¢ cients
fac;i; ax;i; ab;igni=1: (30)
The system of equations (8), (11)-(13), with the derivatives of value functions sub-
stituted from (14)-(15), government spending dened by (6) and  substituted away by
23
combining (11) and (12), contains only three equations; the additional equations can be
obtained by di¤erentiating the original system with respect to the state of the economy,
b. The rst and second di¤erentials of each of the three original equations, together with
the original equations, all evaluated at the steady state, can be solved for the unknown
coe¢ cients (30).
As a by-product of this numerical algorithm, the stability of the system (8), (6), (11)-
(15) at the steady state can be analyzed: if the rst derivative of the policy function
B(b) has an absolute value of less than 1, corresponding steady state of the system is
asymptotically stable. The results reported in the main text are associated with the
stable steady state of the model.
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